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ARBITRARY ENFORCEMENT: WHEN
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS CONTAIN
UNLAWFUL PROVISIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
There are currently two divergent approaches among federal
circuits concerning the enforceability of arbitration agreements that
contain unlawful provisions. The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and District of
Columbia Circuits endorse severance of unlawful provisions and
enforcement of the remaining portions of arbitration agreements.'
This approach compels arbitration to go forward once the unlawful
provisions are severed, despite the objections of a party resisting
2arbitration. Conversely, the Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits hold that arbitration agreements containing unlawful
provisions are entirely void.3  Consequently, claimants who resist
arbitration in these circuits may seek relief in an Article III Court.4
In the severance-versus-voidance debate, each side pursues its
own justifying policy. Circuits favoring severability and enforce-
1. See Booker v. Robert Half Int'l Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd., 344 F.3d 474, 478-79 (5th Cir. 2003); Morrison v. Circuit
City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 675 (6th Cir. 2003); Gannon v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 683 (8th Cir. 2001).
2. See Gannon, 262 F.3d at 681. Severance is a judicial remedy where
courts remove unlawful provisions from private agreements. After the
offending provisions are severed, the remaining provisions of the contract still
remain in force. Id.
3. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Adams i), 279 F.3d 889, 896
(9th Cir. 2002); Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs. Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1286-
87 (1 th Cir. 2001); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th
Cir. 1999); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1233-
35 (10th Cir. 1999); Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1249
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that where the unlawful provisions of the arbitration
clause are fully integrated and contravene public policy as set forth by
congressional mandate, severance is inappropriate).
4. See cases cited supra note 3.
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ment of arbitration agreements containing illegal provisions rely on
the strong federal policy of "rigorously" enforcing arbitration agree-
ments. 5  Conversely, circuits that favor voiding arbitration
agreements with unlawful provisions reason that enforcement would
reward parties who insert illegal provisions in their contracts and
would "fail to deter similar conduct by others." 6 This Note analyzes
the competing policies behind the two divergent approaches, and
attempts to predict which methodology the U.S. Supreme Court will
ultimately adopt, should the Court have the opportunity to make a
definitive ruling on the issue.
To accomplish these ends, Part II of the analysis will trace the
historical, legal, and political development of the Federal Arbitration
Act ("FAA"), including its enactment in 1925, codification in 1947,
and subsequent interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court.7 Part III
of the analysis will focus on the principal severance-versus-voidance
cases from each federal circuit, highlighting each circuit's
interpretation and application of the FAA. Furthermore, Part III will
discuss how the law differs among the circuits with respect to what
constitutes an unenforceable arbitration provision because the U.S.
Supreme Court has established few uniform standards. This circuit-
by-circuit analysis will also show that each circuit imposes a
different burden on parties resisting arbitration to prove that given
arbitration provisions are illegal.
Finally, Part IV revisits the most recent decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court to predict whether the Court will ultimately adopt a
severability or non-severability approach to adjudication of
arbitration agreements that contain unenforceable provisions. This
review of the Court's recent decisions will explain the legal
justifications and policies behind each decision. In addition, Part IV
will profile each individual justice's views regarding arbitration
agreements, contract interpretation, and severability. These profiles
will include analyses of recently confirmed Justice Samuel Alito and
newly-appointed Chief Justice John Roberts, whose 2005 decision in
5. See Michael K. Darning, Note, To Sever or Destroy?: The Eighth
Circuit Allows Invalid Provisions to be Severed from Otherwise Enforceable
Arbitration Agreements, 2002 J. DIsP. RESOL. 425, 428 (2002).
6. Id.; see also Perez, 253 F.3d at 1287.
7. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000) (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 12, 1925,
Ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883).
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Booker v. Robert Half International, Inc.8 established the District of
Columbia Circuit Court's position on the severance-versus-voidance
issue9 .
II. HOW IT ALL BEGAN: THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL
EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
A. Congress Mandates Respect for Private
Dispute Resolution: Legal and Historical Origins of the FAA
The Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA")'0 was enacted in 1925 and
codified in 1947 to "reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements and to place arbitration agreements upon the
same footing as other contracts."1 This traditional judicial aversion
toward arbitration agreements was founded on concern that
compelling private arbitration of disputes deprived aggrieved parties
of their right to vindicate substantive rights in court. 12 By enacting
the FAA, which provides that arbitration clauses are "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract," Congress rejected
this judicial prejudice against arbitration agreements.' 3 In time, the
Court itself disavowed this bias as well. 14
Moreover, the FAA further insures the enforceability of
arbitration agreements by preempting any state law that seeks to
undermine the federal policy of enforcing arbitration. 15 Although the
actual substantive provisions of arbitration agreements are
8. 413 F.3d 77 (2005).
9. Id. at 85.
10. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (originally enacted as Act of Feb. 12, 1925, Ch. 213,
§ 1, 43 Stat. 883).
11. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
12. See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 427 U.S. 427 (1953). This bias was primarily
based on concerns that arbitrators were not bound to follow standard rules of
discovery, evidence or civil procedure. An arbitrator's potential lack of
neutrality was also a prominent concern. See id. at 435-37.
13. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
14. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985) ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.").
15. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 411
(1967).
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interpreted under state contract law,' 6 any question as to the duty to
enforce arbitration agreements is exclusively regulated by the FAA. 7
Therefore, the FAA must be applied to arbitration cases brought
before state courts as well as to cases brought before federal courts.
18
Thus, by making arbitration agreements as enforceable as other
contractual provisions and by preempting state law that would
otherwise interfere with this equal level of enforceability, Congress
established a strong pro-arbitration policy. After the enactment of
the FAA, it was left to courts to determine how extensively and
comprehensively this policy would be applied.
B. The Scope of the FAA Expands: Subsequent U.S.
Supreme Court Interpretation and Application of the FAA
Until the 1970s, the state of federal law regarding the
enforceability and reach of arbitration was uncertain.19 Since the
1980s, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held such
agreements to be enforceable, absent any evidence of
unconscionability, overreaching, or fraud. For example, in Moses H.
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. ,20 the Court
held that any doubts as to arbitrability should be addressed "with a
healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration" and
resolved "in favor of arbitration.,, 21 This respect for the FAA's pro-
16. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)
("When deciding whether parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including
arbitrability), courts generally.., should apply ordinary state-law principles
that govern the formation of contracts.").
17. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
18. Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) ("[T]he substantive rules of
the [Arbitration] Act were to apply in state as well as federal courts").
19. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974)
(finding that an arbitral decision of a Title VII civil rights claim did not
preclude the enforcement of independent statutory Title VII claims); Ellis B.
Murov & Beverly A. Aloiso, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Before and
After Circuit City, 17 LAB. LAW. 327, 329 (2001) (discussing whether the FAA
should apply to employment contracts).
20. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
21. Id. at 24-25. The court held that any doubts regarding the arbitrability
of a dispute should be resolved in favor of arbitration, "whether the problem at
hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of
waiver, delay, or a like defense of arbitrability." Id.
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arbitration policy was further echoed in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
v. Byrd, which held that "the preeminent concern of Congress in
passing the Act was to ... rigorously enforce agreements to
arbitrate. 2
In addition to solidifying the enforceability of arbitration
agreements in the 1980s, the Court also expanded the scope of claims
which are subject to arbitration. Whereas the Court had previously
been reluctant to subject federal statutory claims to arbitration, 23 in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,24 the
Court changed course. The Mitsubishi Court held that a federal
antitrust claim between two commercial parties could be resolved
through arbitration without depriving either party of the ability to
vindicate its statutory rights.25 Under this ruling, a party who has
agreed to arbitrate contractual disputes must also arbitrate all federal
statutory claims that arise, even though these federal statutory claims
are extrinsic to the terms of the contract.
26
Mitsubishi also set the stage for an even greater expansion of the
scope of arbitration agreements. In Mitsubishi, the Court set forth
the broad proposition that all federal statutory claims should be
subject to arbitration, absent congressional intent to "preclude a
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue. ' 27 With
one bold move, the Court set aside decades of reluctance to arbitrate
22. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
23. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56-58. In Alexander, the Court rejected
contractual arbitration of an employee Title VII anti-discrimination claim
because Title VII claims are founded on statutory law extrinsic to the terms of
the claimant's employment contract. Id. The ruling is emblematic of the
Court's reluctance, prior to Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), to entrust a party's statutory claims-
particularly anti-discrimination claims-to private arbitration. Id.
24. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
25. Id. at 626 ("There is no reason to depart from these [FAA] guidelines
where a party bound by an arbitration agreement raises claims founded on
statutory rights.").
26. See id. at 628.
27. Id. The burden for proving Congressional intent to preclude judicial
remedies is further developed in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220, 227 (1987), wherein a party resisting arbitration must evince
congressional intent via the statute's text, legislative history, or from an
inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purpose.
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statutory claims by pronouncing that all statutory claims were
presumptively arbitrable.28
In keeping with its Mitsubishi dicta, the Court steadily expanded
the types of statutory claims that were subject to mandatory
arbitration. In Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,29 the Court
held that claims filed under the Securities Act and Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") could be subject
to mandatory arbitration.30 In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane,31
the Court subsequently held that federal statutory anti-discrimination
claims could also be subject to mandatory arbitration. 32 Finally, in
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the court held that subject to
certain narrow exceptions, employment contracts were subject to
mandatory arbitration, despite concerns that employee agreements to
arbitrate are contracts of adhesion that are neither entered into freely
nor subject to negotiation.33
In addition to expanding the scope of claims which are subject
to the FAA, the Court in the foregoing cases also reiterated the
strong federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements.
According to the court, arbitration agreements should be rigorously
enforced, with the following two exceptions: (1) when "Congress
[has] intended... to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies," 34 or (2)
when such a waiver of judicial remedies conflicts with the
underlying purpose of a federal statute by depriving a party of the
ability to vindicate his substantive statutory rights.35 Absent one of
28. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27.
29. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
30. Id. at 242.
31. 500 U.S. 20(1991).
32. See id. at 29.
33. See Circuit City v. Adams (Adams I), 532 U.S. 105 (2001). The court
narrowly interpreted the FAA's exclusion for "contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign
or interstate commerce," and held that the exclusion only applies to workers
directly involved in interstate transportation. Id. at 112 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1
(2000)).
34. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1985).
35. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477, 483
(1989) (citing Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27
(1987)).
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these circumstances, the claimant will be compelled to resolve his
dispute via arbitration.
The court's endorsement of arbitration agreements, as
demonstrated in these cases, solidified the federal policy favoring
arbitration. At the same time, it firmly placed the burden of proof on
parties resisting arbitration to demonstrate that mandatory arbitration
of claims would deprive them of adequate opportunity to vindicate
their statutory rights.36
While the Court's arbitration rulings clearly expanded the scope
of claims subject to arbitration and imposed a high burden on parties
resisting arbitration,37 the Court's decisions left two important issues
regarding arbitration adjudication unanswered. First, the Court has
yet to determine whether unlawful arbitration provisions can be
severed from otherwise enforceable arbitration agreements, or
whether the offending provisions render the entire arbitration
agreements void. Second, the Court has not established uniform
standards for determining whether given arbitration provisions are
unlawful.
III. SEVERANCE VERSUS VOIDANCE: CIRCUIT-BY-CIRCUIT
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE FAA
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on whether
unlawful provisions within an arbitration agreement should void the
entire agreement or merely be severed, the issue has been
adjudicated by many federal courts of appeal. This section of the
analysis will evaluate the principal appellate rulings, and will discuss
the legal reasoning and policies behind them.
A. Pro-Severability Circuits
The federal circuits that favor severing invalid provisions and
enforcing the remaining portions of an otherwise valid arbitration
agreement generally cite the strong pro-arbitration policy of the FAA
to justify their decisions. 38 Also guiding severability jurisprudence is
the notion that enforcement of arbitration agreements honors the
36. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27 (1987).
37. Id. at 227; see Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
38. See Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 653 (6th Cir.
2003); Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 682 (8th Cir. 2001).
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intent of the parties. 39  These circuits reject the argument that
enforcing the remaining portions of the agreements creates a
perverse incentive for parties to continue inserting unlawful
provisions into their agreements. 40  Additionally, pro-severability
circuits tend to place a higher burden on parties resisting arbitration
to prove that given arbitration provisions are unlawful.
1. Eighth Circuit: Gannon Sets the Stage
Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.4 1 was the first case in which
a federal court of appeals severed an unlawful provision from an
arbitration agreement and enforced the rest of the agreement. 42 It
involved employee sex discrimination and sexual harassment claims
which, under Mitsubishi and Gilmer, were both subject to arbitration.
The arbitration agreement contained a problematic provision that
limited the arbitrator's ability to award punitive damages to the
prevailing party.43 Although the Eighth Circuit, unlike most other
federal circuits, had no precedent for finding such provisions
unlawful at that time, Circuit City conceded that the provision was
illegal, and agreed to sever it from the rest of the agreement.44
The court rejected Gannon's request to deny severance of the
provision in favor of voiding the entire agreement.45 The existence
of a severance clause in the contract served as the primary basis for
the court's decision to sever the illegal provision and enforce the
remaining portions.46 The clause provided that any provisions in the
contract which conflict with applicable law shall be "modified
automatically to comply. '47 The court found that the existence of
this clause demonstrated the parties' intent to proceed with their
39. See Booker v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
40. Id. at 85; Gannon, 262 F.3d at 681.
41. 262 F.3d 677 (8th Cir. 2001).
42. See Gannon, 262 F.3d at 682-83.
43. Id. at 679. The provision limited the prevailing party's punitive
damages to $5,000. Id. at 679 n.2.
44. Id. at 681. Although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had no
precedent for finding limitation-of-damages provisions per se unenforceable at
the time, the district court had already found the provision to be unenforceable,
and Circuit City did not dispute that finding on appeal. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 680.
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agreement in the event that any provision within it was found to be
unenforceable.48
To a lesser extent, the court's decision to reject voidance of the
entire contract rested on the fact that the arbitration agreement only
contained one discrete unenforceable provision that could be severed
without "disturbing the primary intent of the parties to arbitrate their
disputes. 49 It flatly rejected Gannon's public policy argument that
enforcing the remaining portions of the agreement would encourage
employers to insert unlawful provisions into their agreements.5 0 On
the contrary, the court reasoned that severance of the illegal
provision actually benefited the employee by allowing her to
"arbitrate her claims under more favorable terms than those to which
she agreed.,
51
Gannon, then, stands for the proposition that when a contract
contains a severance clause, a presumption exists that the entire
arbitration agreement should not be voided solely because the
arbitration agreement contains one unlawful provision.
2. Sixth Circuit: Severance Clause is Once Again Determinative
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.52 involved employee race
discrimination and sex discrimination claims filed under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.53 As in Gannon, the court found an
arbitration provision limiting a claimant's punitive damages to be
unenforceable. 54  Additionally, the court found a cost-splitting
provision within the agreement to be unenforceable because it
required a claimant to pay excessive fees in order to arbitrate her
claims.55 Here, even though the arbitration agreement differed from
Gannon in that it contained more than one unlawful provision, the
48. Id.
49. Id. at 681.
50. Id. at 682-83.
51. Id.
52. 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (2000).
54. Morrison, 317 F.3d at 670. By the time Gannon was decided, most
federal circuits had found provisions denying claimants all of the statutory
remedies available in court to be either per se unenforceable, or at the very
least, highly suspect. See id.
55. Id. at 668-69.
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court cited Gannon and the existence of a severance clause as
grounds to sever both illegal provisions and enforce the rest of the
agreement.56
Morrison also tried to argue that the arbitration agreement was
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable 57  under
applicable Ohio contract law.58 The court, however, interpreted case
law in such a way as to reject both of these unconscionability
arguments. Most notably, it rejected Morrison's argument that the
arbitration agreement was a contract of adhesion, even though the
agreement was a compulsory condition of employment. 59 Despite
this admitted lack of equal bargaining power, the court rejected
Morrison's claim of procedural unconscionability. It reasoned that
since Morrison held a master's degree in administration, she was
therefore capable of understanding the agreement she was signing.
6'
Morrison's claim of substantive unconscionability was also
rejected, even though her contract contained a provision which
granted Circuit City the unilateral power to alter or terminate the
56. See id. at 675. The Morrison Court held that:
[W]hen the arbitration agreement at issue includes a severability
provision, courts should not lightly conclude that a particular
provision of an arbitration agreement taints the entire agreement ....
For these reasons, we agree with the Eighth Circuit that [the severance
clause] manifests the parties' intent "to sever any terms determined to
be invalid and to allow all claims to proceed to arbitration under the
remaining provisions of the agreement."
Id. (quoting Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 680 (8th Cir.
2001)).
57. Id. at 666-67. Procedural unconscionability exists when one party uses
deceit or superior bargaining power to compel a weaker party to sign a
disadvantageous agreement. See id. at 666. Substantive unconscionability
exists when the actual terms of an agreement violate minimal fundamental
notions of fairness. See Larry H. DiMatteo, The History of Natural Law
Theory: Transforming Embedded Influences into a Fuller Understanding of
Modern Contract Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REv 839, 886 (1999).
58. Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements, like all other
contracts, can be voided upon findings of fraud, overreaching, or
unconscionability. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Under Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), applicable state contract law governs such findings.
59. See Morrison, 317 F.3d. at 666.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 666-67.
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arbitration agreement on December 31 of any given year.62 Morrison
claimed that this arrangement lacked consideration and thus created a
non-mutual obligation,63 but the court disagreed. The court held that
the provision did create mutual obligations because Circuit City's
power to alter or terminate the arbitration agreement was restricted to
only one specific day per year, and therefore was not "unlimited.,
64
As Part III.b.ii of this analysis will reveal, other federal circuits
have found nearly identical arbitration agreements to be both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable.65 This suggests that
while state law governs unconscionability doctrine, the question of
unconscionability and ultimate enforceability may also be influenced
by each circuit's own pro-arbitration or anti-arbitration leanings.
In Morrison, the court's main contribution to the overall
jurisprudence of unlawful arbitration provisions, however, is its
adherence to precedent set in Gannon of finding illegal provisions
presumptively severable when the agreement contains a severance
clause.66 In fact, Morrison extended the holding in Gannon because
it used the presence of a severance clause to justify the enforcement
of an arbitration agreement that had more than one unlawful
provision.
67
3. Fifth Circuit: Who Needs a Severance Clause?
In Hadnot v. Bay, Ltd.,68 the Fifth Circuit adjudicated an
employee race discrimination claim filed under Title VII.69 Here, the
court severed an unlawful limitation-of-damages provision and
enforced the rest of the arbitration agreement, even though the
agreement did not contain a severance clause. 70 The court primarily
based its decision on the pro-arbitration policy announced by the
62. Id. at 667.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Adams III), 279 F.3d 889 (9th
Cir. 2002); infra Part III.b.ii.
66. See Morrison, 317 F.3d at 675.
67. See id. at 668-70.
68. 344 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2003).
69. Id. at 478.
70. See id. at 478-79.
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Supreme Court in Mitsubishi,71 and rejected Hadnot's contention that
the entire arbitration agreement should be voided.72
Despite the lack of a severance clause, the court held that the
illegal limitation-of-damages provision was not integral to the
contract and could be severed without undermining the intention of
the parties.73 Moreover, the court held that the severing of the illegal
clause actually "enhances the ability of the arbitration provision to
function fully and adequately under the law.",74 The court reasoned
that the modified arbitration agreement had the effect of allowing
Hadnot to pursue all of the statutory remedies provided by Title
VII.
71
Interestingly, the Hadnot Court also noted that severing the
illegal provision and allowing the arbitration agreement to go
forward served to "expand the scope of arbitration rather than reduce
or impair it."' 76 This language echoed the Supreme Court's ruling in
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction that any
doubts as to arbitrability of claims should be construed in favor of
arbitration.77 Under Moses H. Cone, courts were encouraged to
construe arbitration agreements in such a way as to render them as
78expansive and enforceable as possible.7 The Fifth Circuit seems to
have adopted that approach in Hadnot.
79
4. District of Columbia Circuit: Severance Clause
Plus Discrete Unlawful Provisions Equals Enforcement
Two major arbitration decisions have come out of the District of
71. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrylser-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614(1985).
72. Hadnot, 344 F.3d at 478.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Title VII provides that prevailing parties may be awarded punitive and
exemplary damages, both of which had been denied under Hadnot's original
arbitration agreement. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2005). After this ban on punitive
and exemplary damages was lifted, via severance of the relevant provisions of
the contract, Hadnot was free to pursue these statutorily-provided remedies.
76. Hadnot, 344 F.3d at 478.
77. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-
25 (1983).
78. See id. at 24-26.
79. See Hadnot, 344 F.3d at 478.
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Columbia Circuit in recent years. In Cole v. Burns International
Security Services,80 the District of Columbia Circuit outlined five
conditions to guarantee fairness in arbitration proceedings, 81 and in
Booker v. Robert Half International, Inc.,82 soon-to-be U.S. Supreme
Court Chief Justice John Roberts established the circuit's framework
for adjudicating arbitration agreements that contain unenforceable
provisions.
83
In Cole, the District of Columbia Circuit became the first federal
court of appeals to create a set of conditions to guarantee fairness in
arbitration proceedings. 84 Prior to Cole, neither the FAA nor the
U.S. Supreme Court had outlined many specific guidelines to govern
arbitration procedures. As a result, most courts had been applying
inconsistent, ad hoc standards of fairness. 85 The standards in Cole
have been subsequently adopted by several other federal circuits that
maintain the Supreme Court has reverse-incorporated these
conditions into Gilmer.
86
What the Cole court did not establish, however, were specific
standards with which to determine whether some of these conditions
were met. Specifically, no standards were created to determine
"more than minimal discovery" or "unreasonable costs. ' 87  The
80. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
81. Id. at 1482.
82. 413 F.3d 77 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
83. Id. at 83-84.
84. Cole, at 1482. The Cole court held that an arbitral proceeding was valid
when it:
(1) [provided] for neutral arbitrators, (2) [provided] for more than
minimal discovery, (3) [provided] a written reward, (4) [provided] for
all... types of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and
(5) [did] not require employees to pay either unreasonable costs or
any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a condition of access to the
arbitration forum.
Id.
85. E.g., id. at 1473 ("Arbitration... is the proverbial 'new kid on the
block,' . . . for it is not only a new idea, but it comes in no clear form .... ").
86. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Adams II1), 279 F.3d 889, 895
(9th Cir. 2002); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc. 163 F.3d 1230,
1233 (10th Cir. 1999). Reverse incorporation occurs when the decision of a
court is retroactively incorporated into a previous ruling, thus imbedding the
case law created by the subsequent ruling into the prior decision.
87. Cole, 105 F.3d at 1482 (referring to provisions #2 and #5).
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District of Columbia Circuit subsequently defined some of these
standards eight years later in Booker.
88
In Booker, Justice Roberts relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's
89ruling in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, which held that
a party claiming that the cost of arbitration is excessive "bears the
burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs.
'" 90
Additionally, Green Tree established that neither silence nor
speculation regarding arbitration costs was sufficient to prove that
the costs were excessive. 91  As such, after Green Tree, a party
resisting arbitration had to meet the high burden of proving that an
arbitration forum was sufficiently expensive, on its face, to prevent a
claimant from asserting his statutory rights.
92
From the Supreme Court's treatment of the issue of
unreasonable cost, Justice Roberts extrapolated the general principle
that a party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that any
kind of arbitration provision would interfere with the vindication of
his statutory rights.93 Thus, a party contending that an arbitration
forum did not provide "more than minimal discovery" carries a fairly
high burden of proof.94 A party could not base his argument on mere
speculation as to how an arbitrator was likely to rule.95 Rather, the
party must show evidence that the arbitration agreement, as written,
denied claimants a minimal level of discovery.
96
In addition to creating a heightened standard for finding
individual arbitration provisions unenforceable, Justice Roberts also
revealed his pro-severability leanings. In Booker, Roberts found an
illegal limitation-of-damages provision to be severable, even though
the employment agreement also contained a clause that prohibited
either party from waiving any provisions without the other party's
written permission. 97  Justice Roberts based this decision on the
88. See Booker, 413 F.3d 77.
89. 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
90. Id. at 92.
91. See id. at 90-91.
92. See id. at 91-92.
93. Booker, 413 F.3d at 81.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 83-84.
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simultaneous existence of a severance clause, holding that severance
of an illegal clause was not "a modification subject to the
requirements of the waiver clause." 98 On the contrary, he reasoned
that severance of the offending clause was a "contingency contem-
plated by the parties at the time of formation." 99 Thus, according to
Roberts, severance honored the intent of the parties.'
00
Justice Roberts' decision in Booker essentially assimilated many
of the holdings from the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, all of
which had taken a pro-severability stance. Specifically, he cited
Gannon and Morrison as precedent for severing illegal provisions
when the arbitration agreement included a severance clause and only
contained "discrete unenforceable provisions."' 0  To a lesser extent,
Roberts also followed Hadnot by rejecting the public policy
argument that severing illegal provisions encourages drafters to
overreach when writing their agreements.'
02
Justice Roberts' rejection of this public policy argument against
severance relied on the rationale that "the more the employer
overreaches, the less likely a court will be able to sever the
provisions and enforce the clause."' 3  Therefore an arbitration
agreement that truly overreached would be so laden with illegal
provisions that it could neither be severed nor enforced. 0 4 This
reasoning suggests that a severability approach may allow parties to
overreach, but it will not allow them to grossly overreach.
Justice Roberts' potential Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding arbitration agreements will be discussed further in Part IV
of the analysis, but there is little doubt that his work at the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia established a very pro-sever-
ability approach and created a high burden for parties wishing to
resist mandatory arbitration.
B. Anti-Severability Circuits
The Fourth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits favor voiding
98. Id. at 83.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 84.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 84-85.
103. Id. at 85.
104. See id.
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arbitration agreements that contain unenforceable provisions. This
provides claimants the opportunity to seek relief in court.10 5 These
circuits seek to discourage drafters of arbitration agreements from
inserting illegal provisions into their agreements and attempting "to
achieve through arbitration what Congress has expressly
forbidden."' 0 6 Thus, these circuits demonstrate greater concern for
claimants' ability to vindicate their statutory rights than for
promoting the federal policy of enforcing arbitration agreements.
1. Eleventh Circuit: Public Policy Prevails
In Perez v. Globe Airport Security Services, Inc.,107 the Eleventh
Circuit clearly signaled its intention to dissuade employers from
inserting illegal provisions in their arbitration agreements.'
0 8
Specifically, the court voided an entire arbitration agreement that
contained an unlawful limitation-of-damages provision because
enforcing the agreement, "despite the employer's attempt to limit the
remedies available[,] would reward the employer for its actions and
fail to deter similar conduct by others."
10 9
Unlike the rulings in Gannon and Booker, the Eleventh Circuit
credited the argument that employers should be deterred from
inserting unlawful provisions in their arbitration agreements. Perez
also differed from Gannon and Booker by holding that a single
illegal provision could taint an entire arbitration agreement at an
integral level."l 0  Thus, even though all three cases involved
employee anti-discrimination claims, only Perez held that a
provision denying statutorily mandated damages could render an
entire arbitration agreement unenforceable."' The Perez court
reasoned that the illegal limitation-of-damages provision undermined
105. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Adams II1), 279 F.3d 889, 896
(9th Cir. 2002); Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs. Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1286-
87 (11 th Cir. 2001); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th
Cir. 1999); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230, 1233-
35 (10th Cir. 1999); Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1249
(9th Cir. 1994).
106. Graham Oil, 43 F.3d at 1249.
107. 253 F.3d 1280 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
108. Id. at 1287.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id.
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the "remedial and deterrent" intent of anti-discriminatory
legislation. 112 This attempt to defeat those remedial and deterrent
functions, according to the court, infected the entire core of the
agreement, rendering the provision non-severable and the agreement
unenforceable. 
1 13
Although this case can be distinguished from Gannon and
Booker because the agreement did not contain a severance clause,
Perez was primarily decided on public policy grounds. The court's
desire to discourage the inclusion of overreaching provisions played
a much larger role in its decision than the absence of a severance
clause. 1
14
2. Ninth Circuit: The Arbitrator's Worst Nightmare
The Ninth Circuit also favors voiding entire arbitration
agreements that contain illegal provisions. In addition to relying on
public policy concerns and the desire to discourage overreaching, the
Ninth Circuit has shown a willingness to find such agreements
unconscionable under traditional principles of contract law."H5 This
combination of finding unconscionability and favoring public policy
over enforcement of the FAA has made the Ninth Circuit more
hostile towards unlawful arbitration provisions than any other federal
circuit. 116
The court's willingness to void an arbitration agreement for
public policy reasons was evidenced in Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO
Products Co. "' In Graham, an oil distributor's arbitration
agreement blatantly violated several provisions of the Petroleum
112. Id. at 1286 ("[S]tatutory claims are arbitrable only when arbitration can
serve the same remedial and deterrent functions as litigation, and an agreement
that limits the remedies available cannot adequately serve those functions."
(citing Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1061-62
(11 th Cir. 1998))).
113. Id. at 1287 ("Globe's attempt to defeat the remedial purpose of Title
VII taints the entire agreement, making it unenforceable.").
114. Id. ("If an employer could rely on the courts to sever an unlawful
provision and compel the employee to arbitrate, the employer would have an
incentive to include unlawful provisions in its arbitration agreements.").
115. Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1248-49 (9th Cir.
1994).
116. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Adams Ill), 279 F.3d 889, 893
(9th Cir. 2002).
117. 43 F.3d at 1248-49.
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Marketing Practices Act ("PMPA").1 8 Most notably, the agreement
denied recovery of punitive damages and attorney's fees, and
shortened the statute of limitations for filing claims from one year to
six months. 19 Since the agreement's numerous unlawful provisions
undermined the intent of the PMPA, the court voided the entire
arbitration agreement and held that "severance is inappropriate when
the entire [arbitration] clause represents an 'integrated scheme to
contravene public policy."" 0
Moreover, the court found that the various illegal provisions
formed a "highly integrated unit" which could not be severed from
the rest of the arbitration agreement without drastically altering the
intent of the entire contract. 121 Thus, Graham primarily highlights
the reluctance of courts to judicially rewrite contracts which are
inextricably laden with illegality, and does not represent a departure
from the arbitration jurisprudence of other federal circuits. In fact,
Graham is even mentioned in Justice Roberts' pro-severability
decision in Booker as the rare type of arbitration agreement that
should rightfully be voided in its entirety.
122
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Adams 11, 123 however,
highlights how its approach to determining severability differs from
that employed by other federal circuits. 124 Specifically, Adams III
demonstrates the court's willingness to find arbitration agreements
with unlawful provisions unconscionable under traditional principles
of contract law. 125 Unconscionability is an equitable doctrine which
permits courts to refuse to enforce contracts to avoid grossly unfair
118. Id. at 1246.
119. Id. at 1247.
120. Id. at 1249 (quoting E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS §5.8, at 70 (2d ed. 1990)).
121. Id. at 1248 ("Here, the offending parts of the arbitration clause do not
merely involve a single, isolated provision; the arbitration clause in this case is
a highly integrated unit containing three different illegal provisions.").
122. Booker v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Justice Roberts mentioned Graham Oil as an example of an arbitration
agreement that "did not contain merely one readily severable illegal provision,
but [was] instead pervasively infected with illegality." Id.
123. 279 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2002).
124. See id.
125. See id. at 893.
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results. 126  Since section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration
agreements may be voided upon "such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract,"' 127 unconscionability
represents a way for judges to strike down arbitration agreements
without violating the preemptive supremacy of the FAA.
128
Moreover, because unconscionability is a judicially created doctrine
which is defined and determined by courts,1 29 it grants judges
discretion to void arbitration agreements for a wide variety of
reasons simply by labeling them unconscionable.
Although the doctrine of unconscionability grants courts
tremendous power to strike down arbitration agreements, the Ninth
Circuit is the only federal court of appeal to aggressively use this
powerful judicial tool to void such agreements. 30 This was
exemplified in Adams III, where the court found an arbitration
agreement contained in an employment application to be
unconscionable, 13' despite the fact that other federal circuits had
found nearly identical Circuit City agreements not to be
unconscionable.132 Specifically, the court found that the mandatory
arbitration agreement was a procedurally unconscionable contract of
adhesion because job applicants, who were forced to sign the
126. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689
(Cal. 2000).
127. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
128. While the Supreme Court, in Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto,
517 U.S. 681 (1996), held that state statutes may not preempt the FAA by
singling out arbitration agreements for special scrutiny, it did not bar judges
from finding arbitration agreements unconscionable. Id. at 687. Thus, courts
have far more power than state legislators to invalidate arbitration agreements,
so long as courts do not strike down such agreements based on state laws that
"singl[e] out arbitration provisions for suspect status." Id.
129. Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689.
130. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the
Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 203-04, 211 (2004).
131. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Adams III), 279 F.3d 889, 893
(9th Cir. 2002).
132. Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 666 (6th Cir. 2003)
(rejecting claims that a nearly identical arbitration agreement contained in an
employment application was either procedurally or substantively
unconscionable). In Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677 (8th Cir.
2001), claims of unconscionability were neither raised by the parties, nor
addressed by the Eighth Circuit.
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agreement in order to be considered for employment, had relatively
little bargaining power compared to Circuit City.' 33 The court also
found the agreement to be substantively unconscionable, or
fundamentally unfair 134 , because only employees were required to
settle claims through arbitration, whereas Circuit City was free to
bring suit in court. 135  Conversely, the same type of one-sided
agreement was found to be neither substantively nor procedurally
unconscionable by the Sixth Circuit in Morrison.'
36
Although matters of unconscionability are determined by
judicially created state case law,' 37 and Adams III followed a
California Supreme Court case that found a similar employment
arbitration agreement unconscionable,1 38 the Ninth Circuit's decision
in Adams III was not primarily based on any unique aspect of
California case law.139  More likely, the outcome was primarily
133. Adams III, 279 F.3d at 893.
134. See supra note 577.
135. Adams III, 279 F.3d at 893-94. This lack of reciprocal obligation to
arbitrate claims was found to constitute a lack of mutuality under California
case law, which mandates that all contracts must evidence a "modicum of
bilaterality." Id. at 894.
136. See Morrison, 317 F.3d at 667.
137. Per Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 65 (1938), and First
Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995), legal and equitable
grounds for revoking contracts are determined by state substantive law.
138. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare Servs., 6 P.3d 669, 694 (Cal.
2000). The California Supreme Court found an employment arbitration
agreement to be unconscionable for similar reasons: the disparate bargaining
power of the parties and the lack of any reciprocal obligation to arbitrate
claims. Id. at 690-94.
139. Although the respective California and Ohio unconscionability
doctrines relied upon in Adams III and Morrison had subtle differences, they
essentially shared the same two-tier structure common to most
unconscionability laws. Specifically, California case law provided that
'unconscionability has both a "procedural" and a "substantive" element,' the
former focusing on ... unequal bargaining power, the latter on 'overly harsh'
or 'one-sided' results." Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690 (quoting A&M Produce Co.
v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 121 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)). Similarly,
"[u]nder Ohio law, the unconscionability doctrine has two components: (1)
substantive unconscionability, i.e., unfair and unreasonable contract terms, and
(2) procedural unconscionability, i.e., individualized circumstances
surrounding each of the parties to a contract such that no voluntary meeting of
the minds was possible." Morrison, 317 F.3d at 666 (quoting Jeffrey Mining
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influenced by the Ninth Circuit's hostility towards the use of
arbitration agreements in employment contracts.
This contempt for arbitration of employment disputes was
revealed two years earlier when the Ninth Circuit tried to void
Adams' arbitration agreement by holding that employment contracts
fall outside the scope of the FAA.140  The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed the ruling, and instead held that employment contracts fell
squarely within the purview of the FAA, save for one narrow
exception. 14  When the case was consequently remanded to the
Ninth Circuit following the Supreme Court's rebuke, the Ninth
Circuit relied on unconscionability as an alternative means of
voiding Adams' agreement. 42 This course of events suggests that
the Ninth Circuit was determined to void Circuit City's arbitration
agreement by whatever means necessary.
Although the Ninth Circuit's willingness to find Circuit City's
arbitration agreement unconscionable is unique, the court's decision
in Adams III also relied on some more traditional methods of
arbitration jurisprudence. First, the court held that the agreement
denied statutory remedies and required claimants to pay excessive
arbitration fees, which ran contrary to the two conditions of fairness
established in Cole v. Burns International Security Services.
143
Prods., L.P. v. Left Fork Mining Co., 758 N.E.2d 1173, 1181 (Ohio Ct. App.
2001)).
140. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Adams 1), 194 F.3d 1070, 1071-72
(9th Cir. 1999). When the Ninth Circuit first heard Adams' case in 1999, it
relied on its recent ruling in Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1094
(9th Cir. 1999), which held that employment contracts were not governed by
the FAA. See Adams I, 194 F.3d at 1070. The Craft court broadly construed
the FAA's exemption for "workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce," 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000), and concluded that the FAA does not apply
to labor or employment contracts that fall under the purview of the Commerce
Clause. Craft, 177 F.3d at 1093.
141. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Adams II), 532 U.S. 105, 109
(2001). The U.S. Supreme Court flatly rejected the Ninth Circuit's broad
interpretation of section 1 of the FAA, and narrowly construed section 1 to
only exclude contracts of interstate transportation workers from the jurisdiction
of the FAA. Id. at 119.
142. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Adams III), 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th
Cir. 2002).
143. Id. at 895. (citing Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482
(D.C. Cir. 1997)). The Ninth Circuit mentions the Cole Court conditions of
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Moreover, the court held that the "objectionable provisions pervade
the entire contract" and that "[r]emoving these provisions would go
beyond mere excision to rewriting the contract." 144 These sentiments
are consistent with other federal circuits that have been reluctant to
sever pervasively integrated contractual provisions. 
145
The Ninth Circuit's arbitration jurisprudence, overall, is rooted
in public policy concerns and a desire to prevent corporations from
imposing overreaching, mandatory arbitration agreements on parties
with inferior bargaining power. 146  The court has shown a
willingness to further this agenda by finding such arbitration
agreements unconscionable, and by finding illegal provisions within
such agreements to be pervasively integrated and non-severable.
147
Since both approaches create grounds for voidance, arbitration
agreements with unlawful provisions are likely to be voided by the
Ninth Circuit.
3. Tenth Circuit: No Severance Clause,
No Ambiguity, No Enforcement
In Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colorado,
Inc.,148  the Tenth Circuit voided an entire arbitration agreement
because it required claimants to pay excessive costs to arbitrate
claims. 149 The court cited Cole as grounds for finding provisions
requiring excessive fees unenforceable. 150  Under Cole, excessive
costs render the arbitral forum inaccessible and thus deny claimants a
forum in which to vindicate their statutory rights.'
5'
fairness as if they had been reverse-incorporated into Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). Id.
144. Id. at 896.
145. See Hadi S. Al-Shathir, Note, The Perils of Temptation: Has the Eighth
Circuit Given Employers An Incentive To Exploit Employees?, 67 Mo. L. REv.
613, 619 (2002).
146. See Adams III, 279 F.3d at 893-94.
147. See id. at 896.
148. 163 F.3d 1230 (10th 1999).
149. The arbitration agreement required claimants to pay a $6,000 deposit,
and also required claimants to pay the arbitrator $250 per hour, plus $125 per
hour of travel time. Id. at 1232.
150. Id. at 1233 (citing Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C.
Cir. 1997)).
151. Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d at 1484.
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Although finding excessive arbitration fees illegal became
standard practice in many federal circuits after Cole' 52, the Shankle
court still had to decide whether to sever the unlawful fee provision
or to void the entire agreement. The court decided to void the entire
agreement for two specific reasons. First, the agreement did not
contain a severance clause, so there was no evidence that the parties
intended the agreement to be severable. Second, the court
distinguished the agreement from Cole, which involved an
ambiguous fee provision that required judicial reinterpretation. 153 In
contrast, the agreement in Shankle was unambiguous and the fee
provision was illegal on its face.' 54 Thus, no judicial reinterpretation
was required and the court declined to "redline" an unambiguous
contract. 155
Hence, the Tenth Circuit's two main reasons for not severing the
illegal provision in Shankle were the absence of a severance clause
and a reluctance to judicially rewrite an unambiguous contact. Both
of these reasons are consistent with the arbitration jurisprudence of
other federal circuits.'
56
152. See supra note 86.
153. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1468. The ambiguity was caused by the fact that
the agreement did not specify which party was responsible for payment of
arbitration fees. Hence, the court was required to utilize traditional methods of
contract interpretation and resolve the ambiguity "against the drafter" and "in
favor of a legal construction of the parties' agreement." Id.
154. See Shankle, 163 F.3d at 1234. In Shankle, unlike Cole, the agreement
specifically required employees to pay a portion of their arbitration fees. As a
result, Shankle would have had to pay between $1,875 and $5,000 to arbitrate
his claim. Id.
155. Id. at 1235.
156. The absence of a severance clause was relied on as a reason to void an
entire arbitration agreement in Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253
F.3d 1280, 1286 (1 1th Cir. 2001). Conversely, the presence of a severance
clause was relied on as a reason to sever illegal provisions in Booker v. Robert
Half Int'l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2005), Morrison v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 675 (6th Cir. 2003), and Gannon v. Circuit City
Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 2001). The reluctance to judicially
rewrite contracts was cited as a reason not to sever illegal provisions in Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Adams II1), 279 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2002) and
Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1994).
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4. Fourth Circuit: Bias and Bad Faith is a Bust for Hooters
The Fourth Circuit voided an entire arbitration agreement in
Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips because nearly every provision
in the agreement was unlawful. 57 In fact, the court held that the
arbitration agreement contained so many biased rules that it created
"a sham system unworthy even of the name of arbitration."1 58 There
were a host of one-sided procedures: the agreement provided for
non-neutral arbitrators, all of whom were to be chosen by Hooters;
employees were required to provide Hooters with a list of witnesses
before proceedings began, while no similar requirement existed for
Hooters; Hooters could expand the scope of arbitration to any matter,
while an employee could not; Hooters could move for summary
dismissal of employee claims before proceedings began, whereas an
employee could not; Hooters could record the proceedings, while
employees could not; and Hooters could modify the arbitration rules
in whole or in part without notice.
59
Consequently the court voided the entire arbitration agreement
because severing these illegal provisions would have effectively
dismantled the contract.' Additionally, because the agreement was
so pervasively laden with illegality, the court took the further step of
holding that it violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.161
Thus, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hooters reiterated judicial
reluctance to sever arbitration agreements that contain pervasive,
integrated illegal provisions. Hooters also reinforced the court's
ability to void arbitration agreements upon "such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."'
' 62
C. Conclusions Gathered from Circuit-by-Circuit Analysis
This circuit-by-circuit analysis has revealed several generally
applicable tendencies in arbitration jurisprudence. First, the presence
or absence of a severance clause can be determinative to a court's
decision to sever the illegal provisions rather than void the entire
157. Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
158. Id. at 940.
159. Id. at 938-39.
160. Id. at 940.
161. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981)).
162. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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agreement. 163 Second, when an arbitration agreement only contains
one discrete, unenforceable provision, courts are likewise inclined to
sever the offending provision and enforce the rest of the
agreement. 164 Conversely, when an arbitration agreement is
pervasively infected with many unlawful provisions or is tainted at
an integral level, courts are likely to void the entire agreement.
65
Despite each circuit's views on public policy or the FAA, these
tendencies are generally followed by all federal circuits.
The analysis also reveals that certain federal circuits that are
hostile towards mandatory arbitration are willing to void arbitration
agreements by finding the agreements unconscionable, or by holding
that the agreements violate the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.' 66 However, it is worth noting that the agreements that have
been voided under this rationale also likely could have been voided
for containing many unlawful provisions that pervaded the
agreement at an integral level. In that sense, the circuits that voided
agreements due to unconscionability and lack of fair dealing merely
found a new justification for voiding agreements that likely would
have been voided by more traditional means. 
167
Based on the analysis, another point bears mentioning. While
many federal circuits have adopted the arbitration fairness standards
established by Cole,168 arguably Green Tree has made it more
difficult to prove that a given arbitration provision fails to meet these
standards. Although Green Tree specifically held that unlawfully
163. See Booker v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 675 (6th Cir. 2003);
Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 2001); ef
Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 1286 (1 1th Cir. 2001)
(citing the absence of a severance clause as a reason not to sever illegal
provisions).
164. See Booker, 413 F.3d at 83; Morrison, 317 F.3d at 680; Gannon, 262
F.3d at 681.
165. See Hooters of Am. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999);
Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1249 (9th Cir. 1994).
166. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Adams III), 279 F.3d 889, 895-
96 (9th Cir. 2002); Hooters, 173 F.3d at 940.
167. See Adams III, 279 F.3d at 895-96; Hooters, 173 F.3d at 940.
168. See Booker, 413 F.3d at 83; Adams III, 279 F.3d at 894; Shankle v. B-G
Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., 163 F.3d 1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999).
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excessive arbitration costs may not be proven by mere speculation,169
Booker has already construed this holding to mean that mere
speculation may not be sufficient to prove the illegality of any type
of arbitration provision.17 0  This expansive construction of Green
Tree, if adopted by other federal circuits, will impose a more difficult
burden on claimants wishing to resist arbitration.
While the above-mentioned tendencies play an important role in
a court's determination of whether to sever unlawful provisions or
void an entire arbitration agreement, public policy is also highly
influential. Federal circuits that favor severance largely rely on the
strong federal policy of rigorously enforcing arbitration
agreements. 171 These circuits routinely cite to the language of the
FAA and to U.S. Supreme Court holdings that have reinforced the
validity of arbitration agreements and steadily expanded the scope of
the FAA. 172  Conversely, federal circuits that favor voiding
arbitration agreements with illegal provisions often rely on the need
to protect weaker parties against overreaching contracts of
adhesion.173 However, it is worth noting that these circuits favoring
voidance rely on public policy arguments that are neither supported
by recent U.S. Supreme Court holdings nor the language of the FAA.
IV. ADDITIONAL U.S. SUPREME COURT
AUTHORITY THAT INDICATES HOW THE
169. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000).
170. See Booker, 413 F.3d at 82.
171. See id. at 79; Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 675
(6th Cir. 2003); Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 677, 679 (8th
Cir. 2001).
172. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Adams II), 532 U.S. 105, 109
(2001) (holding that employment contracts fall within the scope of the FAA,
except for employment contracts of interstate transportation workers); Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (finding that anti-
discrimination claims fell within the scope of the FAA); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985) (holding that
all statutory claims were subject to arbitration, absent Congressional intent);
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983) (holding that any doubts regarding the arbitrability of claims should be
construed in favor of arbitration).
173. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Adams, Ill), 279 F.3d 889, 893
(9th Cir. 2002); Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., 253 F.3d 1280, 1287 (1 1th
Cir. 2001).
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SEVERABILITY ISSUE MIGHT ULTIMATELY BE DECIDED.
A. Vimar and PacifiCare: Rulings That
Reveal a Predominantly Pro-Arbitration Court.
Presently, there are no cases pending before the U.S. Supreme
Court concerning the severance-versus-voidance issue. The matter,
however, seems destined for eventual Supreme Court resolution
because the current arbitrary enforcement of arbitration agreements
deprives drafters of adequate notice of the law. Since lack of notice
makes it difficult for drafters to know whether their agreements will
be voided or enforced, the system of arbitration is thereby robbed of
the predictability and efficiency that make it a favored method of
dispute resolution.
174
Assuming that this lack of predictability will eventually bring
the severance-versus-voidance issue before the Court, several recent
Court decisions hint at how the Court may rule on the matter. Two
cases in particular, Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros S.A. v. M/V Sky
Reefer 175 and PacifiCare Health Systems, Inc. v. Book 176 provide
insight to the Court's disposition regarding arbitration agreements.
While neither case concerns the issue of severance, both cases reveal
the Court's general views regarding the enforceability of arbitration
agreements.
In Vimar, the Court held that an arbitration agreement between
an American fruit distributor and a Japanese shipping company was
enforceable, despite the fact that the arbitration proceedings were to
take place in Japan, where the American company's rights might not
have been properly vindicated. 177  The Court stated that "mere
speculation" that a claimant's rights may not be vindicated is not
sufficient to void the agreement.'
78
This ruling is consistent with the Court's subsequent decision in
Green Tree,179 which held that mere speculation of excessive
174. See, e.g., Bhd. of Locomotive Engrs v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co.,
373 U.S. 33, 47 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (1963) (commending the efficacy
and efficiency of private labor arbitrations).
175. 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
176. 538 U.S. 401 (2003).
177. See Vimar, 515 U.S. at 541.
178. See id.
179. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
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arbitration costs was not sufficient to find an arbitration agreement
unenforceable. 80 Read together with Green Tree, Vimar suggests
that the Court is strongly inclined to enforce arbitration agreements
and is predisposed to find problematic provisions within such
agreements enforceable. More specifically, Vimar illustrates that
parties resisting arbitration bear a difficult burden in trying to prove
that particular arbitration provisions are illegal.18
The Court's pro-arbitration stance was further revealed in
PacifiCare. Here, the Court enforced an arbitration provision
barring punitive damages, even though the applicable RICO statutes
mandated the award of treble damages.1 82 The Court arrived at its
ruling by declining to determine in advance whether the bar on
punitive damages was equivalent to a denial of treble damages.'
83
This ruling not only reinforced the Court's reluctance to speculate on
how problematic provisions might be interpreted, but also suggested
that the Court was willing to go to great lengths to construe these
provisions in such a way as to render them enforceable. 184 Thus,
PacifiCare indicates that since Vimar, the Court has become even
more determined to enforce arbitration agreements, and even less
willing to find particular provisions unlawful. 
85
Though the Court's rigorous enforcement of arbitration
agreements in these two cases did not specifically address the
severability issue, it certainly tends to show that the current Court
does not favor voiding arbitration agreements. Additionally, Vimar
and PacifiCare reveal a Court that is eager to interpret individual
arbitration provisions in a manner that renders them enforceable. It
follows, that if the Court were called on to decide whether to void an
entire arbitration agreement or merely to sever an unenforceable
provision, it would be more likely to find the agreement severable
180. Id. at 91-92.
181. See Vimar, 515 U.S. at 555 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
182. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406-07 (2003).
183. Id. ("[W]e should not, on the basis of 'mere speculation' that an
arbitrator might interpret these ambiguous agreements in a manner that casts
their enforceability into doubt, take upon ourselves the authority to decide the
antecedent question of how the ambiguity is to be resolved." (quoting Vimar,
515 U.S. at 541)).
184. See id.
185. Id.
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and enforceable.
B. Positions Taken by Sitting Supreme
Court Justices on Recent Arbitration Cases
If the severance-versus-voidance issue were to come before the
Court, each justice's views on arbitration would impact on the
Court's ruling. In order to accurately assess each justice's position, a
brief overview of his or her decisions from the Court's most recent
arbitration rulings is in order.
1. Justice Stevens
Justice Steven's record clearly indicates that he is neither a
proponent of rigorously enforcing arbitration agreements, nor in
favor of expanding the scope of the FAA. He has dissented, in
whole or in part, in nearly every prominent pro-arbitration ruling
186from 1985 to 2001. In Mitsubishi, McMahon, and Rodriguez De
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, for example, Justice Stevens
advocated that statutory claims should not be subject to mandatory
arbitration. 187  Moreover, in Gilmer, he adamantly argued that
employer-employee disputes should not fall within the scope of the
FAA. Finally, in Vimar he expressed his willingness to aggressively
use Section 2 of the FAA188 to invalidate arbitration provisions that
are overreaching or unconscionable.
1 89
Justice Stevens clearly favors construing problematic arbitration
agreements in such a way as to render them unenforceable. This is
186. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Adams II), 532 U.S. 105, 124
(2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531
U.S. 79 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Vimar
Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 542 (1995)
(Stevens J., dissenting); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20,
36 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 268 (1987)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
187. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 641 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see McMahon, 482
U.S. at 268 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
188. See supra text accompanying note 11.
189. See Vimar, 515 U.S. at 555-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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apparent by noting that he has consistently resisted the steady
expansion of the scope of the FAA, and has shown a tendency to find
ambiguous arbitration provisions invalid. 9 ' Thus, it seems likely
that he would be inclined to entirely void an arbitration agreement
that contained unlawful provisions. Justice Stevens would be even
more likely to void such an agreement if it pertained to an employer-
employee dispute, given his view that they fall outside the scope of
the FAA.' 9
2. Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
While not outspoken critics of arbitration like Justice Stevens,
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer have expressed several
specific concerns about the increasing role of arbitration. In
particular, these three justices have argued that employment
contracts should not be governed by the FAA. 9 2 Additionally, these
justices have expressed concern that excessive arbitration costs may
deter claimants from vindicating their statutory rights. 
193
Their view that employment contracts should not be governed
by the FAA was expressed in Adams /194 where Justices Ginsberg
and Breyer joined in both Justice Stevens' and Justice Souter's
dissents. 95  The dissenting opinions argued that the FAA's
exemption for interstate employment contracts should be read
broadly to exclude all employment contracts that fall within
Congress's commerce power. 196  This view diverged from the
majority in Adams II, which construed the exemption narrowly to
190. See id.
191. See Adams II, 532 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. See id.
193. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 93-94 (2000)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194. 532 U.S. 105.
195. See id. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 133-37 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
196. Id. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 133-37 (Souter, J.,
dissenting). In particular, Steven's dissent argued that Congress never
intended the FAA to apply to employment contracts. Id. at 128 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Souter's dissent contended that the FAA's exemption for
interstate employment contracts should be read broadly to reflect the expanded,
modem understanding of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 137 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
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only exclude contracts of interstate transportation workers.' 
97
Additionally, in Green Tree, Justices Souter and Breyer joined
Justice Ginsburg's dissent regarding the issue of excessive costs of
arbitration proceedings.' 98  This dissenting opinion expressed
concern that excessive costs made arbitral forums inaccessible to
certain claimants, and thus deterred them from vindicating their
statutory rights. 199 Specifically, dissent contended that arbitration
agreements should clearly state the costs of pursuing claims through
200arbitration, and further disagreed with the majority's holding that
claimants resisting arbitration bear the difficult burden of proving
that such costs are excessive.
2 0 1
The opinions of Justices Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg-as
expressed in Adams II and Green Tree--do not address the
severance-versus-voidance issue, but they do articulate a desire to
construe arbitration agreements in such a way as to protect
vulnerable claimants, particularly employees.02 This desire to
protect less powerful parties may inspire these justices to void an
entire arbitration agreement with unlawful provisions, especially if
the less powerful parties are employees. This assumption, however,
is far from certain.
3. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy have sided with the
majority in most of the major pro-arbitration rulings handed down by
the Court during their tenure.20 3 As such, these three justices favor
subjecting employment disputes and statutory claims to arbitration
proceedings 20 4 and are proponents of rigorously enforcing such
197. Id. at 119.
198. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 92-93 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
199. See id. at 93-94.
200. Id. at 95-97.
201. See id. at 90-92.
202. See id. at 95-97 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (Adams II), 532 U.S. 105, 128-29 (2001)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 133-37 (Souter, J., dissenting).
203. See Adams H, 532 U.S. 105; Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 79; Vimar
Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M.V. Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
204. See Vimar, 515 U.S. at 530; Adams I, 532 U.S. at 109.
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agreements. 205 In so doing, they impose a high burden on parties
resisting arbitration to prove that the contested arbitration agreements
are unlawful.2 °6
As an example, in Adams II, Justice Kennedy found
employment contracts subject to the FAA and was joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas in his majority opinion.20 7 Justices Scalia and
Thomas also joined Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Vimar,
which held that a party resisting arbitration must prove that a
contested arbitration provision will produce an unlawful result in all
circumstances in order to invalidate that particular provision.20 8
Additionally, all three justices joined Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion in Green Tree, which imposed a difficult burden on
claimants who wish to prove that arbitration costs are excessive.
20 9
Since Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas are proponents of
rigorously enforcing arbitration agreements and tend to construe
arbitration agreements in such a way as to render them enforceable, it
is doubtful that these justices would void an entire arbitration
agreement that contains unlawful provisions. Conversely, these
justices would be likely to sever the offending provisions and enforce
the remaining portions of the agreement.
4. Chief Justice Roberts
As discussed previously discussed, Chief Justice Roberts'
decision in Booker indicates that he favors rigorously enforcing
arbitration agreements.21 0 Booker also revealed Justice Roberts'
tendency to construe ambiguous arbitration provisions in such a way
as to render them enforceable.211 In fact, Booker held that an
arbitration provision should be found unlawful only if, on its face, it
is guaranteed to produce an unlawful result.21 2 These aspects of
Booker indicate that Justice Roberts will bring a very pro-arbitration
205. See Vimar, 515 U.S. at 528.
206. See id.
207. See Adams 11, 532 U.S. at 119.
208. See Vimar, 515 U.S. at 540-41.
209. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82-92
(2000).
210. See Booker v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
211. See id. at 81.
212. Id.
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stance to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Additionally, since Justice Roberts expressed his views on the
severance-versus-voidance issue in Booker, he is the only sitting
justice to have specifically revealed his position on the matter. In
essence, Booker expressed Justice Roberts' view that unlawful
provisions should be severed unless the agreement lacks a severance
clause and is inextricably laden with illegality.
213
Since Justice Roberts is only inclined to void arbitration
agreements with numerous unlawful provisions and is reluctant to
find such provisions unlawful, he is unlikely to void arbitration
agreements with problematic provisions.
5. Justice Alito
The relevant positions of newly appointed Justice Samuel Alito
are difficult to examine because he has not yet decided any
arbitration cases for the Supreme Court. Moreover, since the Third
Circuit did not rule on any watershed arbitration cases during his
tenure, Justice Alito's stance on the severance-versus-voidance issue
is particularly hard to infer. In the absence of any clear record on the
issue, one can only attempt to predict his disposition by examining
his general approach toward contract interpretation and enforcement.
In this regard, Justice Alito's record shows him to be a
proponent of ardently enforcing private agreements, often in a rigid,
formalistic manner. 214 The most glaring example of this stringent
method of contract interpretation occurred in MBIA Insurance Corp.
v. Royal Indemnity Co. 2 15 In MBIA, Justice Alito, then sitting on the
Third Circuit, applied an "objective theory" of contract interpretation
which mandates strict adherence to the wording of a contract,
regardless of whether it reflects the intent of the parties.216 As a
result of this approach, an insurer who insured a loan company
213. See id. at 84.
214. See Larry E. Ribstein, Justice Alito on Business, FORBES, Jan. 13, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/columnists/2006/01/13/alito-ribstein-comentary-
cxlr 01 16alito.html.
215. 426 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2005).
216. Id. at 210 ("Although the law of contract generally strives to enforce
agreements in accord with their makers' intent, the objective theory considers
'objective acts (words, acts and context)' the best evidence of that intent."
(citation omitted)).
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against any fraud was found liable for fraud perpetrated by the loan
company itself.217 Although the intent of the insurance company was
only to insure the loan company against fraud perpetrated by
customers,2 18 Justice Alito's black-letter method of contract
interpretation bound the insurer to its own vaguely-worded contract,
regardless of the inequitable result.
Justice Alito's ardent enforcement of agreements, however,
seems to waver when employer-employee disputes are at issue.219 In
fact, he tends to be more forgiving when employers seek to be
relieved of their contractual obligations, but less accommodating
when employees try to prove antidiscrimination claims.220  In
Luden's, Inc. v. Local Union No. 6, for example, Justice Alito
dissented when the court compelled an employer to arbitrate
employee grievances. 221 Likewise, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon
Seamen's Union, he relied on public policy grounds to vacate an
arbitration ruling that compelled a shipping company to reinstate an
employee who was found to be "highly intoxicated" while on
222duty. Conversely, his "tightly constricted" approach towards
employee antidiscrimination claims creates a very high burden for
employees to meet.
223
Justice Alito's record of siding with employers more often than
employees has branded him business-friendly by proponents, and a
foe of workers' rights by detractors. 224  While this pro-business
217. The contract provided that "payment for losses under this policy shall
be absolute, continuing, irrevocable and unconditional irrespective of... any
fraud with respect to the student loans." Id. (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 211.
219. See AFL-CIO, REVIEW OF JUDGE SAMUEL ALITO'S RECORD IN
WORKERS RIGHTS CASES (Dec. 14, 2005), http://www.aflcio.org/mediacenter/
prsptm/upload/alito-review.pdf.
220. See id.
221. See Luden's, Inc. v. Local Union No. 6 of the Bakery, Confectionery
and Tobacco Workers' Int'l Union, 28 F.3d 347, 364 (3d Cir. 1994) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
222. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 11 F.3d 1189, 1190 (3d
Cir. 1993).
223. See AFL-CIO, supra note 219.
224. See Molly Selvin, Court Nominee Has Free-Market Bent, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 1, 2005, at C1. Jonathon Turley, a professor at George Washington
University Law School described Justice Alito as "a strong ally for business
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stance might place Justice Alito on the severability side of the
severance-versus-voidance issue, it will not drastically change the
balance of the Court on this issue because retired Justice O'Connor
was herself a committed proponent of arbitration.
225
6. Conclusions to be Drawn from Analysis
of Sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justices
Although we do not have definitive indications of how each
Supreme Court justice would vote on this issue, we can make certain
inferences based on the tendencies each justice has displayed in past
decisions. For example, since Justice Stevens is opposed to the
expanded scope of the FAA, and does not believe that statutory
claims or employer-employee disputes should be governed by the
226FAA, we can infer that he is likely to construe arbitration
agreements in such a way as to render them unenforceable. 227 It
follows that Justice Stevens probably would void an arbitration
agreement that contains unlawful provisions.
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer are not as adamantly
interests .... He will be swimming in the deep right of the court's pool on
business questions." Id. Conversely, AFL-CIO President John Sweeney
claimed Alito's past decisions "repeatedly put basic rights at risk." Id.
225. In fact, Justice O'Connor sided with the majority in most of the Court's
pro-arbitration decisions. See infra text accompanying notes 205-07. She
joined with the majority in Gilmer and Adams II, which found employer-
employee disputes to fall within the scope of the FAA, and also agreed with
the majority in Mitsubishi, Rodriguez, and McMahon, which held that statutory
claims were subject to arbitration. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams
(Adams I1), 532 U.S. 105, 109-23 (2001); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23-35 (1991); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 478-87 (1989); Shearson/American Express, Inc.
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 222-42 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 616-40 (1985). O'Connor also joined
with the majority in Green Tree, which imposed a high burden on parties
trying to prove that arbitration costs are excessive. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala.
v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-92 (2000). Since Justice O'Connor was
therefore a proponent of rigorously enforcing arbitration agreements, Justice
Alito's pro-enforcement, pro-business sentiments probably will not alter the
balance of power on the Court regarding this issue.
226. See supra Part IV.b.i.
227. See id.
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opposed to the expanded scope of the FAA as is Justice Stevens.
228
However, they have expressed concern that certain arbitration
agreements may unfairly favor powerful parties, notably
employers. 229 Therefore, it is possible that these three justices may
favor voiding arbitration agreements with unlawful provisions when
those provisions deter vulnerable parties from vindicating their
statutory rights.230 This assumption, however, is highly conjectural.
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Roberts are in favor of
rigorously enforcing arbitration agreements and tend to construe
arbitration provisions in such a way as to render them enforceable.
231
As such, these four justices are unlikely to void an entire arbitration
agreement that contains discrete illegal provisions.
232
Overall then, Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, Alito, and
Roberts are not likely to void an arbitration agreement that contains
illegal provisions, while Stevens is likely to void such an agreement.
By contrast, the decisions of Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer are much
more difficult to predict. However, since there are five likely voices
in favor of severance, one clearly in favor of voidance, and three
voices somewhere in-between, the severance side of the debate
seems to have a more solidified base. As such, the proponents of
severing the illegal provisions would probably prevail.
Of course, it is impossible to predict how the Court would rule
on an abstract basis, based only on the judicial tendencies of its
members. Nonetheless, it can be stated with some certainty that the
likely proponents of severance are more numerous and more unified
in their approach than the likely proponents of voidance.
V. CONCLUSION
Overall, this analysis of the severance-versus-voidance issue
reveals several trends in the arbitration jurisprudence of the U.S.
Supreme Court. First, the Court has steadily expanded the scope of
the FAA since Mitsubishi, holding that antitrust claims, anti-
discrimination claims, RICO claims, and employment contracts are
228. See supra Part IV.b.ii.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. See supra Parts IV.b.iii-iv.
232. See id.
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all subject to arbitration. 233  Second, since 1983, the Court has
consistently followed its reasoning in Moses H. Cone that any doubts
regarding the arbitrability of a dispute should be resolved in favor of
arbitration.234  This expansion of the scope of the FAA and this
tendency to construe disputes in favor of arbitrability show the
Court's propensity to rigorously enforce arbitration agreements.
Thus, the Court is much more inclined to find arbitration agreements
enforceable than it is to strike down such agreements for public
policy reasons. In fact, the policy of rigorously enforcing arbitration
agreements has consistently trumped any public policy concerns,
such as fear of corporate overreaching or unconscionability, for the
235past twenty two years.
For these reasons, the federal circuits that favor severance of
unlawful provisions and rigorous enforcement of arbitration
agreements are much more aligned with the current jurisprudence of
the U.S. Supreme Court. These pro-severance circuits share the
Court's view that the mandates of the FAA overshadow public policy
concerns of corporate overreaching. 236 Moreover, these circuits also
follow the Court's tendency to construe ambiguous agreements and
provisions in favor of arbitrability. 237 Therefore, the methodology of
these circuits is firmly rooted in the recent rulings of the U.S.
Supreme Court, and in the Court's current interpretation of the FAA.
Conversely, the federal circuits that favor voiding arbitration
agreements with unlawful provisions are in conflict with the
sentiments of the U.S. Supreme Court, and with the Court's reading
of the FAA.238 These pro-voidance circuits, which favor public
policy concerns over rigorous enforcement of arbitration agreements,
are clearly not in alignment with the Court, which has steadily
expanded the scope and power of the FAA since Moses H. Cone and
Gilmer.
239
Additionally, the federal circuits that favor severance more
closely adhere to the views of the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 20-28.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
235. See supra Part II.b.
236. See id.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 159-62.
238. See supra Part II.b.
239. See supra text accompanying notes 20-28.
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Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas have consistently ruled in
favor of rigorously enforcing arbitration agreements, and Chief
Justice Roberts' pro-arbitration, pro-severance views were very
clearly revealed in Booker.240  The only justice to consistently
diverge from this pro-enforcement trend, meanwhile, has been
Justice Stevens, whose views have rarely prevailed since
Mitsubishi.
241
For the foregoing reasons, if the severance-versus-voidance
issue were to come before the Court, the Court would likely hold that
arbitration agreements with unlawful provisions should be enforced,
so long as the offending provisions can possibly be severed from the
remaining portions of the agreement. The Court's policy of
rigorously enforcing such agreements, combined with its tendency to
construe such agreements in favor of enforceability, strongly
suggests this outcome. Therefore, unless an arbitration agreement
contains numerous facially unlawful provisions that are inextricably
integrated into the agreement, as in Graham, the Court is likely to go
to great lengths to sever the offending provisions and enforce the rest
of the agreement.
This likely outcome is consistent with the Court's desire in
Gilmer "to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as
other contracts. 242 In fact, it suggests that since Gilmer, arbitration
agreements have arguably been placed upon better footing than other
contracts, because the presumption that such agreements are
enforceable has become so deeply entrenched.
This probable outcome is troubling for those who are compelled
to agree to arbitrate claims as a condition of transacting business
with more powerful parties. It is especially problematic for
employees who are compelled to sign arbitration agreements as a
condition of employment, because such parties have virtually no
bargaining power and typically lack the resources to challenge
unlawful arbitration provisions in court. If courts are unwilling to
void arbitration agreements with illegal provisions, employees who
are bound by such agreements will have little or no recourse.
Moreover, refusing to void arbitration agreements with illegal
240. See supra Parts IV.b.iii-iv.
241. See supra Part IV.b.i.
242. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
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provisions provides no incentive for employers to remove unlawful
provisions from their arbitration agreements. Conversely, it
essentially assures employers that their arbitration agreements will be
enforced, so long as the unlawful provisions are severable and
discrete. Furthermore, even in the unlikely event that a claimant
resisting arbitration is able to prove that an arbitration agreement
contains illegal provisions, the remaining portions of the arbitration
agreement will still be enforced and the employer will not be subject
to any punitive results. In effect, this amounts to a policy of
permitting contractual overreaching by stronger parties, as long as
the overreaching is not too pervasive or extreme.
VI. POSSIBLE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSES & REMEDIES
This inequitable result seems likely, based on current case law,
unless Congress refines the language of the FAA to prevent weaker
parties from being exploited by disadvantageous arbitration
agreements. The most direct approach would be for Congress to
expressly provide that arbitration agreements with unlawful
provisions are unenforceable. Such a congressional decree would
render the entire severance-versus-voidance issue moot and put
drafters on notice that overreaching arbitration agreements will not
be tolerated.
Congress could further aid drafters by defining what constitutes
an unlawful arbitration provision, and by determining a standard of
proof for finding such provisions unenforceable. 243 Since the FAA
currently provides virtually no guidance as to how arbitration
agreements should be interpreted or construed,24  these
determinations have almost exclusively been made by courts.
245
243. For example, the FAA could be made to expressly prohibit arbitration
agreements that compel claimants to waive punitive damages. Additionally,
the FAA could impose a ceiling on arbitration costs payable by claimants who
were compelled to sign arbitration agreements as a condition of employment.
244. The only FAA guidelines regarding interpretation of arbitration
agreements can be found in 9. U.S.C. § 2 (2000), which provides that
arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
245. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 86-88. Additionally, many
standards governing arbitration agreements and procedures have been
promulgated by private arbitration organizations such as the American
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Congressionally codified standards would unify the interpretive
methods of the federal circuits and increase the consistency with
which many recurrent types of arbitration provisions are enforced.
A more tangential remedy, which has been introduced as of this
writing, is to remove employment contracts from the purview of the
FAA. The Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act of 2005
("PCRPA") seeks to exclude all employment contracts from the
reach of the FAA, except when employees consent to arbitrate claims
after they arise, or when employment unions consent to arbitrate
claims under collective bargaining agreements.246 The bill was
introduced by Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio) on June 17, 2005, and was
referred to the Subcommittee on Employer-Employee Relations on
July 25, 2005.247 While barring arbitration of employment contracts
does not specifically address the severance-versus-voidance issue, it
would nevertheless significantly diffuse the situation, given the high
percentage of severance-versus-voidance cases that have arisen from
the employer-employee context.
248
Ultimately, until either Congress acts or the Court rules
definitively on the severance-versus-voidance issue, the arbitrary
enforcement of arbitration agreements with unlawful provisions is
likely to continue. The resulting uncertainties and inequities that
these inconsistent rulings impose, on both individuals and businesses
alike, will also likely persist. *
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